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TOWARD AN AFRICAN MARITIME ECONOMY
Empowering the African Union to Revolutionize the African
Maritime Sector
Commander Michael L. Baker, U.S. Navy
A key source of American leadership throughout our history has been
enlightened self-interest. We want a better future for our children and
grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peo-
ples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.
The belief that our own interests are bound to the interests of those be-
yond our borders will continue to guide our engagement with nations
and peoples.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 2010
The high profile of Somali piracy has brought the issue of African maritimesecurity to the attention of world leaders and citizens. This crisis, however,
is not the only challenge facing Africa “in the maritime”; rather, it is a symptom
of a much deeper problem—that Africa suffers from weak maritime governance
and the lack of a harmonizing vision for an African
maritime economy. Every year in Africa billions of
dollars’ worth of fish is illegally captured, billions of
dollars’ worth of drugs and arms are shipped overseas,
pirates capture and hold for ransom hundreds of mar-
iners operating commercial and private vessels, ban-
dits steal maritime oil worth billions of dollars, and
thousands of liters of waste are illegally dumped.
Some of these crimes flow into Africa from abroad
(including much of the illegal fishing and narcotics
trafficking), while others (such as piracy) go from the
inside out. These nefarious activities are global in
their reach and require global action if we hope to
eliminate their impact.
Africa’s maritime realm has deep significance for
African and international actors. The oceans, ports,
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and inland waterways of the African continent are more than mere sources of
food and energy; they are how Africa trades with the rest of the world. Accord-
ingly, the African maritime sector holds the key to wealth and prosperity for the
continent as a whole. If Africans hope to realize a prosperous future as stake-
holders in an emerging market or even as global market leaders, they will need
first to master the maritime domain. But for too long governments and institu-
tions have turned blind eyes toward the African seas and allowed security prob-
lems, corruption, bureaucracy, and weak infrastructure to rob Africans and
their honest partners of food, energy, wealth, and prosperity. Given the impor-
tance of the maritime in the global market, and hence in Africa, the United
States and other international partners should consider ways to support mari-
time sector development in Africa, to help actualize plans, strategies, and part-
nerships that improve security, governance, infrastructure, and commercial
investment. As the U.S. national security strategy clearly states, it is in the Amer-
ican interest to do just that. To highlight this reality, the National Security Coun-
cil encouraged the Department of State and the U.S. Africa Command to hold an
international conference to discuss the issues and solutions surrounding the Af-
rican maritime domain in October 2010.
But more than simple collaboration on maritime security, the international
community needs an African strategy for maritime development, a plan to tie to-
gether existing and future actions, to help establish an African maritime econ-
omy that creates wealth from the sea for Africans, and to mobilize international
instruments so as to assist in implementing African maritime initiatives toward
good governance. In short, we need to find a way collectively to revolutionize the
African maritime sector and to chart a course toward an African maritime
economy.
Putting complex, multinational plans into action is always challenging, espe-
cially on so large a scale—fifty-four countries are directly involved. Toward that
end this article outlines some ideas, both immediate and long-term, for actualiz-
ing plans and coordinating efforts in pursuit of an African maritime economy.
The central idea presented is that of an “International Charter for the African
Maritime Sector,” an agreement by which a global coalition would empower the
African Union (AU) and its regional economic communities to help Africans
create a secure, well governed, and efficient maritime domain, one capable of at-
tracting investment and enabling global trade. To accomplish these goals the
charter would provide technical assistance, resources, checks and balances, and
oversight for the implementation of strategies and plans across the maritime
spectrum; it would tie resource distribution to compliance with AU maritime
policies; and it would offer significant international assistance in establishing
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and enforcing African maritime laws, thereby allowing Africans initially to con-
centrate their resources on improving their maritime infrastructures.
This article also offers a way to organize African efforts throughout the mari-
time realm and the continent as a whole through a “Special Representative for
the African Maritime Sector” at the African Union. The office would provide
clear leadership in the maritime domain, aiming to tie together currently dispa-
rate efforts in infrastructure, security, safety, governance, trade, and commerce
under one overarching strategy.
There are other simple steps that can be taken now, like expanding combined
patrols and improving information fusion and sharing; this article addresses
these. But first, let us examine the idea of prosperity from the sea and make the
case for a comprehensive approach to achieving it, then assess some of the key,
but disconnected, efforts that Africans and international partners have already
undertaken. Finally, we will delve into the proposals for an international charter
and special representative.
GROWTH AND PROSPERITY FROM THE SEA: THE CASE FOR A
HOLISTIC APPROACH
In 2007 Africa accounted for a mere 2.7 percent of global trade, and less than 1
percent of African exports were in the form of manufactured goods (the lowest
percentage of any region in the world).1 Imports of manufactured goods from
the European Union (EU), China, and the United States alone were nearly dou-
ble the volume of African exported manufactures. Africa imported 14 percent of
the total global agricultural trade (the highest percentage of any region in the
world).2 Raw commodities accounted for nearly 80 percent of all African ex-
ports, with oil representing close to 60 percent of that total.3 If African states
hope to break the cycle of poverty, they will have to spur real economic growth
through more diversified trade and capture a greater share of the global market
for manufactured and finished goods. It is one thing for, say, Exxon-Mobil to ex-
port oil in the present risky and inefficient maritime environment; it is a com-
pletely different matter for lower-margin companies like Gap Inc. to establish
textile factories in that environment. In order to compete in the field of manu-
factured goods, African states will have to demonstrate to investors and compa-
nies that goods produced there can reliably get to market. The maritime sector,
therefore, must feature prominently in any plans for sustained economic growth
through the trade of manufactured goods.
Ninety percent of global trade moves over the oceans, and containerized traf-
fic accounts for an increasingly large share of total maritime shipments.4 This
means that African countries hoping to spur growth through global trade will
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have to attract not only land-based companies but shipping firms as well. This
poses a significant challenge for African countries, because the region’s ports are
currently the least efficient in the world; dwell times are nearly quadruple those
of Asian ports, and no single African port ranks in the seventy most productive
in the world.5 One extra day in port can add $35,000 to the operating costs
of a shipping company.6 The increasing rate of containerized traffic places an
additional burden on small African ports, which often lack the equipment nec-
essary to load and unload containers. In West Africa, movement of twenty-five
containers per hour is the norm, compared to 425 in many Asian ports.7 In addi-
tion, many ports in Africa cannot handle ships of even average size;8 add to this
shortcoming the fact that the world shipping industry has been quickly modern-
izing its fleets, replacing older and smaller vessels with newer “megacarriers,”
and the picture for African maritime transport looks bleak. Africa’s countries
must make large improvements in their port infrastructures through expansion,
maintenance, and improvement in efficiency if they hope to attract leading
shipping companies; if they fail, “several coastal countries in West and Central
Africa could become ‘de facto’ landlocked, having to bear approximately the
same costs as a landlocked country.”9
Port efficiency, of course, is not enough to draw business; a country or region
also needs safe and secure waters, coupled with transparent and convenient
trade regulations, to attract investment and maritime shipping. As it is, high
rates of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Guinea have elevated insurance rates and have even caused some shipping com-
panies to avoid particular routes to or around Africa. Poor dredging and inade-
quate navigational aids add to the risks of operating ships in many parts of
Africa. All of this leads to low traffic, which in turn causes governments to levy
high tariffs to generate sufficient funds for port operations further discouraging
shipping companies from operating in Africa.10 As if that were not enough, Afri-
can governments apply more bureaucratic red tape to maritime trade than does
any other collective region, aggravating inefficiency and increasing opportuni-
ties for corruption.11 It is an ugly cycle and a difficult one to break.
Breaking this cycle will require a coordinated, sustained effort across a broad
front, nothing less than a campaign to revolutionize the African maritime sector
holistically, across its entire spectrum—improving safety and security, gover-
nance, and industrial infrastructure and efficiency. There is no evidence in Af-
rica now of any national, regional, or continental strategy of this kind. As a
result, for example, while some countries, like Nigeria, have made improve-
ments in port efficiency, their advances are offset by poor security—and vice
versa.
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Safety and security create confidence in a market, by reducing physical risks,
cutting insurance costs, and improving operating timelines. Good governance
offers assurance that economic activity (hence investments) will be handled
equitably and transparently, with no hidden costs or lengthy delays. Industrial
infrastructure serves as the backbone of maritime ventures, providing the neces-
sary ways to move goods efficiently to and from markets. These three elements
are necessary components of a coherent and efficient strategy to attract capital
investment so as to develop or enhance national markets. Markets being neces-
sary for jobs, wealth creation, and growth generally, it stands to reason, once
again, that a comprehensive strategy to develop the African maritime sector is
important not only for that sector but for the future prosperity of the continent
as a whole.
A number of governments and international institutions (including the Afri-
can Union) have developed good ideas to improve, say, security or transporta-
tion but too often have not carried them out. A comprehensive strategy should
aid actualization of those plans, sequencing action, prioritizing funding, and of-
fering clear direction to regional economic communities and national minis-
tries as well as a confident vision for the international community.
AFRICAN UNION (AND RELATED) EFFORTS
In January 2010, during the fourteenth African Union Summit, the AU heads of
state endorsed the “African Union Maritime Transport Charter” and the “Mari-
time Transport Plan of Action,” and they affirmed the previous October’s
“Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, and Protection of
the Marine Environment.” (The charter and plan of action have gone to the
fifty-three member states for ratification and will become official policy upon
the approval of fifteen.) To those involved behind the scenes, the summit seemed
a momentous occasion, a breakthrough for the maritime domain. After all, these
documents are the culmination of a great deal of work by some individuals at
the African Union, mostly within the Infrastructure and Energy Commission,
who are certainly to be commended. Their titles sound both impressive and
comprehensive. But in fact the papers beg for legitimacy due to a lack of
inclusivity and weak enforcement mechanisms. Shortly after the AU summit
other efforts to draft maritime strategies and plans started to emerge, but they
have had little success, lacking the clear support of the African Union’s leaders.
Nevertheless, despite their lack of leadership support and unifying strategy,
these documents do contain some of the key elements of success.
The Durban Resolution. From 12 to 16 October 2009, African Union maritime
transport ministers held a conference in Durban, South Africa. There they
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endorsed the Maritime Transport Charter and the Maritime Transport Plan of
Action, drafted previously (see below). They also issued what became known as
the “Durban Resolution,” declaring their shared commitment to tackle the is-
sues of maritime safety, security, transport, and environmental protection. Spe-
cifically, they condemned piracy and expressed concern over toxic dumping and
maritime pollution. Through this resolution the ministers called on the AU to
assume leadership of the efforts they had endorsed, encouraged regional organi-
zations and states to start taking action on them, and invited international orga-
nizations and global partners to be active participants.12 The resolution is
significant mostly for the fact it clearly signals the African states’ wish—the lat-
ter confirmed by the heads of state at the annual summit—for AU leadership
and their desire to partner with the international community. The resolution
falls short, however, in terms of consensus, in that it came from a meeting of
transport ministers only, with no coordination across other ministries before
the conference.
The Maritime Transport Charter and Plan of Action. The charter adopted by
maritime transport ministers in Durban in October 2009 was based on an origi-
nal 1994 document updated between 2007 and 2009 by the African Union’s
Commission for Infrastructure and Energy.13 The charter addresses a multitude
of such areas as “promoting the growth and development of African merchant
fleets,” “encouraging” reform and efficiency in port operations, “encouraging”
the expansion of information systems, and “promoting” the establishment of re-
gional or national maritime funds for the development of maritime industry.
The charter also calls for modernization and harmonization of maritime laws
across subregions, expansion of maritime regulations, and improved transpar-
ency and accountability. Finally, it mentions the need to improve security capa-
bilities and to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea.14 Interestingly, it does
not speak to illicit trafficking at sea or illegal, unregulated, and unreported
(IUU) fishing. Also, and unfortunately, the charter fails to address adequately
the dire condition of port infrastructure across the continent, which comes as a
surprise, given that the African Union Commission for Infrastructure and En-
ergy drafted the document.
Nonetheless, in a bold and important step, the Maritime Transport Charter
proposes continental, regional, and national organizations that would carry out
the maritime transport plan. Specifically, the charter urges the AU, the regional
economic communities, and states to create a continental unit for the coordina-
tion of maritime activities at the African Union; regional and continental mari-
time administrations; maritime training institutions; councils to defend the
interests of local shippers; and a fifteen-member continental “follow-up
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committee” charged with holding periodic meetings to promote and monitor
the implementation of the charter. The chief responsibility of these new bodies
would be to carry out the Maritime Transport Plan of Action. Sadly, most of
those bodies do not exist yet, and there is scant evidence that they are forthcom-
ing. If the African Union and the regional economic communities do not imple-
ment and empower these oversight and representative bodies, there will be little
reason to expect any positive effects from the Maritime Transport Charter or
plan of action.
The Maritime Transport Plan of Action lays out seven objectives, with multi-
ple sub-objectives: institutional and legal measures; capacity building; strength-
ening of maritime safety and security; enhancement of port performance;
strengthening of inter-African and international cooperation; facilitation and
financing of maritime transport and ports; and promotion of the development
of maritime transport equipment.15 The plan of action describes a host of neces-
sary measures across a fairly broad spectrum of the maritime domain, and it as-
signs responsibility and timelines for each measure at the state, regional, or
continental level. It does not, however, identify any means or priorities—a
critical failure for anyone hoping to use the plan of action as a mechanism for
maritime-sector development. It contains no sticks and no carrots.
All of these objectives and measures—we have mentioned only a few from a
long list—come across more as lofty aspirations than as directives. The Mari-
time Transport Charter and its plan of action seem to lack authority, and their
language begs the question of how institutions are to implement this broad
agenda. Sure enough, though the African Union heads of state approved the
Durban Resolution, the Maritime Transport Charter, and the Maritime Trans-
port Plan of Action, these documents sit on a shelf, making no progress. Why?
There are three likely reasons. First, as mentioned above, they are products of a
single commission at the African Union—Infrastructure and Energy—and were
approved through the meetings of transport ministers only. Other important
organs of the AU, such as the Peace and Security and the Trade and Industry
commissions, were not involved in their creation. Yet these three documents
clearly creep into the “lanes” of other commissions and ministers, whose
“buy-in” is required if they are to be implemented.
Second, as discussed above, while the documents call on the African Union to
lead the implementation of maritime initiatives, the AU has no human or capital
resources to assume such a role and has sidelined the creation of the “Continen-
tal Maritime Coordination Unit” mentioned above until a suitable donor takes
an interest in funding it.
Finally, these documents on their own cannot convince Africans that revolu-
tionizing the maritime sector is a worthwhile endeavor. They make no attempt
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to show the value of maritime trade, the costs of unsafe and inefficient practices,
or the risks posed by persistent maritime threats. They are not tied to any grand
strategy that achieves commitment at the national and regional levels and coor-
dinates multi-ministerial efforts toward a common goal of prosperity from the
sea. That is understandable, since it is certainly not the role of the Infrastructure
and Energy Commission to develop such a thesis, but it remains disappointing
nonetheless, because the plan of action puts forth a good many necessary and
specific bureaucratic actions. If coupled with an overarching vision for the Afri-
can maritime sector, a robust plan for improving maritime security, and sepa-
rate plans for governance, maritime commerce growth, and financial and
oversight mechanisms, the maritime transport documents could succeed.
The Draft “Maritime Strategy.” Perhaps recognizing the need for a unifying vi-
sion, the African Union contracted with the Brenthurst Foundation (a South Af-
rican think tank) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (a U.S. Department
of Defense research institute at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.) to provide the
union’s deputy chairman a maritime strategy for Africa. The resultant vision pa-
per made a good case for the overarching importance of the maritime domain.16
It also identified a number of areas that should be addressed by the African
Union and its member states to improve safety, security, and the maritime econ-
omy. That strategy, however, remains a white paper, not official AU guidance.
What is more, since no commission within the AU participated in its creation,
once again a noble effort has failed to gain a sense of ownership among various
actors within the African Union itself.
Experts Workshop on Maritime Security. Barely had the ink dried on the draft
maritime strategy before another group embarked on a similar project. Feeling
that the Maritime Transport Plan crossed into its purview and considering the
draft maritime strategy an outsider’s project, the African Union’s Peace and Se-
curity Commission held an “Experts Workshop on Maritime Security” in Addis
Ababa on 6 and 7 April 2010. The conference organizers aimed to generate dis-
cussion leading to specific inputs to a continental strategy for maritime
security.17 To their credit, they invited representatives of other AU commissions,
welcoming a notable speech on maritime immigration by the commissioner of
social affairs. The delegates emphasized the problems of maritime safety,
security, and protection of the environment. They also underlined the need for
legislation, implementation of agreements, and enforcement, all the while
stressing that regional and international cooperation is paramount to success.
The delegates broadly agreed that they needed to get to work on areas already
covered by resolutions and agreements but also to develop an extensive mari-
time strategy that would give structure to Africa’s efforts in the maritime realm.
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Beyond these conclusions, however, the workshop bore little fruit. The top
leadership of the AU did not attend, and the agenda did not address any aspect of
the earlier draft maritime strategy. Although invited, no business leaders or
economists attended the workshop, and so the workshop did not touch the eco-
nomic aspects of the maritime domain. It remains to be seen whether the Peace
and Security Commission can draft a comprehensive maritime strategy and gar-
ner the active participation of other commissions; there are reasons to doubt its
staying power. Already stretched thin across several pressing peace operations,
the commission has dedicated only one officer to work on maritime security, as a
collateral duty; at the next sign of continental conflict it will likely struggle to
maintain any focus on the maritime strategy and find it difficult to continue to
coordinate a broad array of actors.
The Djibouti Code of Conduct. Another instrument, though not a product of
the African Union, should be mentioned here. The International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) sponsored a meeting in Djibouti (the capital of the Republic
of Djibouti) on 26 January 2009 to forge an agreement to cooperate in the inves-
tigation, arrest, and seizure of people reasonably suspected of piracy and to con-
duct shared operations.18 Fifteen countries have signed so far: the Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen. The
signatories pledged to review their national maritime laws to ensure they are ad-
equate for criminalizing piracy; however, to date only the Seychelles and Kenya
have actively upheld their agreements to try captured pirates in their courts.
Ironically, the IMO also led a second meeting, this one of African and Middle
Eastern maritime security specialists, just as the 12–16 October 2009 Durban
meeting was going on, but in Victoria, the capital of the Seychelles. Representa-
tives from East Africa, the African Indian Ocean islands, and from father abroad
met to discuss implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Unfortunately,
the African Union was not represented at those meetings, most likely because its
maritime experts were in Durban. During the meeting, working groups identi-
fied the need for technical assistance in creating national laws and for steering
committees to monitor progress of implementation of the code. The delegations
agreed that adequate training at all levels of maritime administration and law
enforcement was important but also stressed the need to obtain naval and coast
guard assets to conduct law-enforcement operations. Finally, they agreed that
the IMO should establish a Djibouti Code implementation team.19 (The IMO
recently created that team, and its work is under way. Its successes and failures in
the future will offer valuable insight into this type of cooperative approach and
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These documents and efforts are largely technical in nature; they lack a defined
end state, something that ties them together coherently and assures global part-
ners that their resources would not be squandered. With its multiple, disparate
initiatives in progress to develop specific strategies, charters, and plans of action,
the African Union is in effect tackling symptoms, and in uncoordinated ways,
without comprehensively addressing root causes—the lack of an authentically
African maritime economy and of effective maritime governance. Whatever
strategy or strategies emerge, it is clear that the AU and its members need a vi-
sion for the entire spectrum of the African maritime domain—and this would
mean the involvement of every commission in the union, something that has
not happened to date. Africa and its global partners need then some coherent
technical mechanism to ensure consistent implementation of strategies,
charters, and plans, as well as to distribute burdens. By endorsing the Durban
Resolution, heads of state have called upon the African Union to lead efforts to
improve the maritime sector. This leadership must produce guidance, oversight,
and coherence for a wide variety of initiatives already ongoing at the national,
regional, and international levels.
NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
Many African states and regional organizations, not waiting on leadership from
the African Union, have embarked on a number of programs to address safety
and security in African seas. Several of these efforts are visionary and effective;
all suffer, however, from a lack of coordination among a broad set of stake-
holders and therefore tend, as noted, to address only security symptoms rather
than other core problems of governance and economic development. Neverthe-
less, all of them are commendable and could help to build momentum toward
deeper, long-term solutions for the African maritime. The below are only a few
of the most prominent examples.
The ECCAS Maritime Safety and Security Strategy. In October 2008, ECCAS,
the Economic Community of Central African States, produced a study meant to
help the regional bloc secure its economic interests in the maritime domain.20
The draft offered an approach to protecting offshore oil resources, fisheries, and
sea routes, as well as fighting a host of maritime crimes and achieving a reliable
search-and-rescue capability.
ECCAS has conducted one combined maritime patrol, which is a step toward
meeting its strategic vision for security. It has not yet undertaken a second pa-
trol, however, which may be due to a lack of funds or to a lengthy planning pro-
cess. In any event, ECCAS has focused on the security aspect of the operations,
which is reasonable at this point. The real challenge will come when ECCAS tries
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to tie security operations into law enforcement and judicial procedures ashore.
Here it may benefit from the expertise and financial support of the AU or inter-
national partners.
Southern African Development Community Statement on IUU Fishing. On 4
July 2008, in Windhoek, Namibia, the ministers responsible for marine fisheries
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met to take action
on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The meeting reaffirmed the
commitment of their countries generally to cooperate in regulating and enforc-
ing fishing laws and to take the following measures: review and harmonize na-
tional fishing laws, strengthen fishing regulations, share information, and
improve the monitoring of fishing, including multinational patrols.21 While it is
not clear that much action has actually occurred in the areas of regulation and
legislation, the statement has spurred some of the countries to conduct joint pa-
trols to enforce maritime laws.22
Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols. Building on the momentum of the
SADC statement on IUU fishing, in March 2009 the states of Kenya, Mozam-
bique, South Africa, and Tanzania collectively sponsored the patrols in the In-
dian Ocean by the South African offshore patrol vessel Sarah Baartman,
assigned to the environmental-protection service.23 Embarked was an interna-
tional team of eleven inspectors, with Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania each
providing two inspectors, and South Africa five. During the one-month opera-
tion the team inspected forty-one vessels, levied ten fines, and seized six ships
for violations of national maritime laws. In the highlight of the operation, the
joint team seized a vessel in the Tanzanian exclusive economic zone carrying
over three hundred tons of illegal tuna. Like the ECCAS patrol this operation fo-
cused on tactical procedures afloat; officials in Tanzania were left scrambling to
determine what to do with the seized fish. In the end, they gave the fish to an or-
phanage, but with comprehensive planning at the outset they might have real-
ized a greater gain by selling the fish on the market and donating some of the
proceeds to the orphanage and applying the rest to continued operations.24 As it
was, funding challenges have caused these countries—including South Africa
—to delay future plans to continue this type of operation. This is a possible can-
didate for international support.
MOWCA Agreements. The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
(MOWCA) has drafted a number of policies and initiatives to promote safe mar-
itime transport and maritime security in the eastern Atlantic Ocean. On 31 July
2008 MOWCA members agreed to a memorandum of understanding imple-
menting a regional coast-guard network. Fourteen of the twenty coastal
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member states signed the agreement: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Repub-
lic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The
memorandum established four operational patrol zones, stretching from An-
gola to Mauritania.25 MOWCA aims to harmonize policy and regulation in West
and Central Africa to comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Secu-
rity Code, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the Search and Rescue conven-
tion, and the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea.26 The
organization is also working to establish an “Association of Maritime Adminis-
trations” in the region to promote harmonization and information sharing.27
So far, there is little evidence that MOWCA, without financial support and
binding authority over member states, has achieved anything beyond formaliz-
ing its intentions on paper. But it is a potential regional leader for maritime is-
sues on the Atlantic seaboard, and with funding and oversight it might be the
regional agent for a number of the requirements in the AU’s Maritime Transport
Charter. Along these lines MOWCA specifically desires to create and manage a
“Port Management Association of West and Central Africa,” a “Union of African
Shipper’s Councils,” an “Association of National Shipping Lines,” and three
maritime academies in West Africa (to be affiliated with the IMO’s World Mari-
time University in Sweden).
“Regional Strategy against Piracy and for Maritime Security in Eastern and
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.” On 7 October 2010, a collection of min-
isters (mostly ministers of foreign affairs) of East and southern Africa held their
second ministerial meeting of 2010 to address maritime security and piracy.
This conglomeration of ministers met to bolster cooperation on maritime secu-
rity among regional countries and with the European Union, as well as other in-
ternational partners, such as the International Maritime Organization and the
United States. This strategy is complemented by a “Regional Plan of Action.”
These two documents together are perhaps the best example of a comprehensive
regional effort to tie functional areas of maritime security to strategic ends. The
strategy has three main elements: addressing sources of Somali piracy inland in
Somalia, bolstering international efforts, and improving African maritime secu-
rity capacity.
Maritime Centers of Excellence. One can find maritime academies in each re-
gion of Africa—in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, and South Af-
rica, to name a few—all aimed at delivering maritime education to port-
authority administrators, merchant mariners, naval and coast guard officers,
and marine police. International cooperation in these schools has been on
the rise. Recently, for example, the Kenyan navy, the Global Maritime and
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Transportation School, U.S. Africa Command, and the U.S. Naval War Col-
lege have teamed to create a new curriculum at Kenya’s Bandari Port Author-
ity College, in Mombasa. These existing institutions could play important
roles in standardizing maritime education across the continent and become
key instruments in disseminating strategic guidance from the African Union
for the improvement and coordination of maritime governance. As things
stand now, however, these schools operate independently of one another, of
the African Union, and of their associated regional economic communities.
Counterpiracy Task Forces. There are at least three multinational counterpiracy
operations currently under way in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean near
the Horn of Africa, as well as numerous other unilateral operations: the Euro-
pean Union’s Operation ATALANTA, a NATO task force, Combined Task Force
151, the Chinese navy’s Task Force 529, an Indian task force, a Malaysian task
force, a Russian task force, and the Yemeni coast guard.28 In all, more than thirty
vessels are currently patrolling these waters to deter, prevent, and defeat acts of
piracy, representing every continent except Antarctica and—despite the adop-
tion of the Djibouti Code of Conduct—Africa. While these task forces bring the
benefit of nonstop maritime patrols, they do not involve Africans in their opera-
tions, and they do not address crimes that are of high importance to Africa,
namely, illegal fishing and illegal dumping. As a result, they do not forge trust
and partnerships; rather, they are viewed with indifference in many parts of Af-
rica, where governments and communities are very reluctant to take action
against African pirates.29
The Africa Partnership Station. In 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Africa initiated a
multinational effort to improve maritime safety and security in Africa through
partnership with African navies and coast guards.30 This initiative is known as
the Africa Partnership Station (or APS);31 it features engagement of a variety of
types, including conferences, mobile training teams, and “banner ship” deploy-
ments, all geared toward building maritime awareness, capacity, capability, and
regional cooperation.32 U.S. Naval Forces Africa has led three Africa Partnership
Station banner-ship deployments in West and Central Africa and one in East Af-
rica; there have also been several deployments of smaller vessels for shorter du-
rations. These deployments strive to train and exercise African maritime forces
in tactics, techniques, and procedures so as to solidify their professionalism and,
more broadly, address the need for maritime-sector development in Africa.
Ships of the Netherlands and Belgium have flown the Africa Partnership Station
banner on training missions in West and Central Africa, extending combined
training and familiarization in these subregions, and helping to make the Africa
Partnership Station a truly international effort. American agencies like the
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have put represen-
tatives on board APS ships, where they work with fisheries agencies, scientists,
and universities to address fisheries management, weather issues, and other
nonmilitary maritime topics.
NOAA’s presence on the APS missions is a good sign, but other agencies—like
the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Commerce Department
—are notably absent. U.S. Naval Forces Africa would like to expand the scope of
APS deployments in order to address maritime-sector development more
broadly, but it lacks two necessary elements for taking that step: guidance and
authority from the U.S. government and guidance from and coordination with
either the African Union, a regional economic community, or an African state.
In short, “ownership” of this initiative has to move above and beyond U.S. Naval
Forces Africa if it is to accomplish its more far-reaching goals. The Department
of State could take the lead on this mission, in partnership with the African
Union.
African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. The United States and the gov-
ernment of Cape Verde initiated the African Maritime Law Enforcement Part-
nership (AMLEP) in June 2008.33 This operation pairs African maritime
boarding teams and police with U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams and U.S.
Coast Guard or Navy vessels in combined operations to enforce African mari-
time law, along the lines of the Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols.
AMLEP has been a successful operation, by which partners have built their own
capacities and improved the management of their maritime environments
through combined maritime law enforcement. It offers an immediate opera-
tional framework for small African maritime forces, extending their reach
throughout their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. AMLEP opera-
tions focus on illegal fishing, narcotics smuggling, and other illegal trafficking.
To date U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Naval Forces Africa have conducted
five AMLEPs (June 2008 and October–November 2008, with Cape Verde;
July–September 2009, with Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal, and Sierra Leone;34
December 2009, with Sierra Leone; and June–August 2010 with Cape Verde,
Senegal, Morocco, and Sierra Leone). France has provided cueing support (i.e.,
surveillance and vectoring by maritime patrol aircraft based in Dakar, Senegal),
and U.S. Africa Command has coordinated the operations, through the Mari-
time Analysis Operations Center–Narcotics in Lisbon, Portugal. Two AMLEP
operations resulted in five fisheries interdictions, including the program’s first
seizure (a Taiwanese fishing boat, subsequently auctioned), which sent a strong
message to illegal operators but also generated the payment of significant fines
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to Sierra Leone. The United Kingdom has conducted two AMLEP-like opera-
tions with Cape Verde, and Spain and Malta have expressed interest in joining
the initiative. To date, the partnership has focused predominantly on operations
at sea and hence has mostly practiced military capabilities; attempts have been
made to incorporate other important categories of stakeholders, such as cus-
toms agencies, port authorities, fisheries management, national police, and
transportation ministries, but much still needs to be done on those lines.
While AMLEP is ahead of the counterpiracy task forces in involving Africans,
it lags behind in presence, patrolling only about two months a year. Given cur-
rent financial constraints, global donors will have difficulty mustering the polit-
ical will to extend missions of this type without confidence that investments will
pay off in long-term stability and new markets. Given, however, an international
mechanism that coordinates support efforts, offers transparent oversight of
maritime governance reform, and ties funding to performance, donor countries
may find reasons to sustain and expand joint maritime patrols in African waters.
A VISION FOR THE LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AFRICAN MARITIME ECONOMY
To take on a challenge as daunting, and as necessary, as developing maritime
economies and solidifying maritime governance, infrastructure, safety, and se-
curity, the African Union, its commissions and regional economic communities,
and its member states will need considerable participation from global stake-
holders. Indeed, developing strategies and plans is no small feat, but it is far eas-
ier than converting ideas into realities, especially considering the resource and
structural challenges that the AU and its members face. To complicate matters,
the African maritime is marked by a variety of interdependent but different, un-
linked, and uncoordinated policies, resolutions, codes, and activities. The sched-
uling of simultaneous meetings on major maritime issues in Durban and
Victoria mentioned above was but one sign that the right hand is not working
with the left. The contrast between operational success at sea and procedural
disarray ashore in handling seized fish in the instance cited is another indicator
of poor coordination and planning. Moreover, the very fact that the African
Union initiated a workshop to develop a maritime security strategy during the
same week that two think tanks delivered an independent draft strategy at the
request of the AU itself reveals lack of clear vision and leadership. Add to all of
this the absence of any plan to revitalize African maritime commercial sectors
—or of any mechanism for oversight or enforcement of the continental mari-
time agreements that already exist—and one sees that haphazard attempts to ad-
dress security issues can go nowhere.
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Yet some of the strengths of the African Union, such as its global profile and
power to create mandates, could allow it to organize continental efforts to im-
prove the maritime sector as a whole. Indeed, as we have seen, the African mari-
time transport ministers at the Durban conference called on the AU to exert just
such leadership. To get things moving the AU could use its influence to broker a
formal international agreement to coordinate and facilitate global participation
in African maritime development, with an eye to empowering the AU itself to
lead this revitalization. The International Maritime Organization has signaled
an intention to do something of this nature in support of the Djibouti Code of
Conduct, and the signatories of both that code and the Durban Resolution have
encouraged global partners to take active roles.
One way to combine the efforts of global partners with those of Africans
would be to create an “International Charter for the African Maritime Sector,”
under the combined leadership of the AU, the IMO, and the UN.35 Under the In-
ternational Charter global partners, both public and private, would acknowl-
edge both their interests in the African maritime and their responsibilities
toward it and would pool their resources, fiscal and material. The African Devel-
opment Bank and the World Bank could jointly manage fiscal resources, releas-
ing them only when the AU, IMO, or UN directed. African states or regional
maritime organizations could choose to become members of the International
Charter in order to contribute to the pool or to have access to its resources; the
charter would establish requirements that states and organizations would have
to meet. The African Maritime Transport Charter already identifies most of the
requirements. The International Charter would simply construct a basic set of
rules to enforce implementation; in other words, it would put teeth into the
Maritime Transport Plan of Action and other relevant plans of action. If wisely
constructed, these rules would in turn enable African states and organizations to
develop good, noncorrupt maritime structures in accordance with the transport
charter. The African Union and regional organizations like MOWCA or SADC
would then be able to apply not only political oversight in goading members
slowly into action but fiscal control—to stimulate implementation and, coupled
with routine inspections, ensure honest practice. Global partners could also do
more than just donate money, materiel, and systems: they could cooperate in
maritime law enforcement.
It is one thing to patrol territorial seas occasionally and conduct random inspec-
tions. It is something else—involving a completely different level of governance
—to regulate activity at sea transparently, monitor that activity effectively, and
enforce laws consistently. Some governments would be tempted to invest imme-
diately in maritime-response forces to take quick advantage of potential revenue
from fines and sales of seized contraband. While this benefit is certainly
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important, enlarging coast guards would require extensive capital investment
and developed maintenance capabilities. Rather, under the International Char-
ter global partners might form combined task forces in order to enforce African
or international maritime law. Operating along the lines of the Southern African
Joint Surveillance Patrols and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partner-
ship, these task forces would include African boarding teams, seamen, officers,
information systems, and, where possible, vessels. Most of the principal ships,
however, would come from global partners, distributing the costs and reducing
immediate financial burdens on African states and organizations. Meanwhile,
African maritime law-enforcement and security forces would increase their
skills through continuous participation in these task forces.
Revenue obtained from fines and seizures generated by task force operations
might go into an “African Maritime Trust” (managed, again, by the African De-
velopment Bank and the World Bank); global partners might match those funds
if African states and organizations demonstrated good governance in the mari-
time. An African member state could request to withdraw funds from the trust
to build elements of maritime governance, infrastructure, and administration,
or, having met the regulations and rules, to upgrade and maintain its own
weapon and law-enforcement equipment.
The idea here is that global partners (like South Africa, the United States, the
United Kingdom, India, France, Brazil, China, Russia, NATO, and the EU, as well
as companies like Maersk, Chevron, and Dubai Ports World) would provide op-
erational platforms in the near term so that Africans could focus their time and
money on other areas necessary to maritime economies and governance. These
partners would also agree to provide maritime security assistance and capacity-
building resources only through the International Charter. The AU, the IMO,
and the UN would lead the charter, and the African Development Bank and
World Bank would manage all finances. Eventually, after establishing elements
of maritime governance and administration, and with the approval of the AU
and the IMO, African states could access monies directly to enable them to in-
crease their roles in the combined task forces, gradually replacing the global
partners. With help of economists from the World Bank and the African Devel-
opment Bank, the International Charter could loosely predict how long a state
should need assistance—meaning that it would not have to represent an
open-ended commitment from global stakeholders.
Agreement of major global partners to join the International Charter and
provide maritime security assistance through its auspices only could have a re-
sounding impact on the African maritime sector as a whole. This system would
create a series of checks and balances, distribute the burden globally, and en-
courage fiscal responsibility and good governance. At the same time, it would
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relieve African states of some of the costs of security and enable them to invest
first in maritime infrastructure, institutions, laws, regulations, and processes.
This charter, in other words, would provide a road map, complete with ways and
means, to establish authentic maritime economies and governance. To realize
this goal the African Union will need to establish, at its headquarters, in its com-
missions, and within its regional economic communities, a strong foundation
for maritime-sector development.
WHAT THE AFRICAN UNION CAN DO NOW
To make the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector a reality and
actualize the African Union’s existing maritime plans, the AU should take some
important steps immediately. At the top of the list lies establishing clear leader-
ship for the development and organization of an African maritime economy.
The chairman of the union could designate one of the commissioners as the
continental “lead” for maritime sector development; alternatively, the chair
could appoint a “Special Representative for the African Maritime Sector”—a ci-
vilian from the private sector of strong character and well-known connections
and background (ideally including maritime business experience)—who does
not come from any of the AU’s commissions but has the experience and author-
ity to ensure authentic involvement from each. First, the special representative
should form the Continental Maritime Coordination Unit and Maritime Trans-
port Review Committee, as established by the Maritime Transport Charter.
Next, the special representative should organize and mobilize the rest of the AU
to play productive roles in the maritime domain; to date only two of the eight
departments have done so—Energy and Infrastructure and Peace and Security.
Maritime issues cut across the AU, and every commission has an important role
to play, as the sidebar shows.36
After organizing the AU to deal more fully and aptly with the African mari-
time, the special representative should immediately begin engaging the private
sector. The special representative will need to induce private enterprises to invest
in African maritime industries and provide their perspectives and expertise in
the development of African maritime plans and strategies. Maritime businesses
will play decisive roles in the success of the maritime sector as a whole; African
maritime businesses would benefit themselves in particular by helping policing
efforts at sea, through the distribution of information and pressuring govern-
ments to implement standard regulations, invest in maritime governance, and
(at least to the degree that it is in their respective interests) enforce maritime laws.
Next, the special representative should set the Maritime Coordination Unit
four immediate tasks. First, the unit should begin assessing maritime laws across
the continent and work to improve their harmonization. This is an important
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step toward attracting investment and improving maritime governance; it
would also support combined maritime law-enforcement operations or other
forms of cooperative security and follows guidelines already established by the
Maritime Transport Charter.
Second, the Maritime Coordination Unit—working with all African Union
commissions, the regional economic communities (subregional treaty organi-
zations recognized by the AU), and the private sector—should develop a clear
strategy for a maritime economy that includes the enabling elements of gover-
nance, infrastructure, trade, safety, and security and plainly tells global partners
where they can best contribute. Each AU commission and each regional eco-
nomic community should then write a plan of action to achieve its particular re-
sponsibilities. Continental and global partners need a clear indication of
priorities and key tasks, and the AU commissions need guidance for their roles.
Third, the Maritime Coordination Unit would naturally encourage the re-
gional economic communities to involve themselves in their respective regional
maritime administrations as established by the Maritime Transport Charter to
promote standardization, integration, and implementation of plans and strate-
gies. The AU can provide strategic leadership, but the regional economic com-
munities will have to lead implementation on the regional level.
Fourth, the AU’s Maritime Coordination Unit should immediately empha-
size the fusing and sharing of maritime information in and among the conti-
nent’s five early-warning centers. Maritime domain awareness is simply critical
for understanding the maritime environment and the development of maritime
governance. A great deal of “maritime domain awareness” capability already ex-
ists in Africa but is underutilized and ineffective. Fusing information in regional
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AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION AND MARITIME ISSUES
Peace and Security: common security and defense policy
Political Affairs: civil society, refugees, human rights, transparency, and
accountability
Infrastructure and Energy: transport (including maritime transport in its
core function); tourism; energy; infrastructure (ports); cooperation on
safety, security, and environmental protection; tariff harmonization; promo-
tion of public/private partnership for transport, communications, tourism,
and energy; interlocutor with IMO for maritime safety
Social Affairs: drug control and related crime, migration, and labor
Human Resources, Science, and Technology: information management
and exchange, hydropower development
Trade and Industry: increased intra-African trade, access to global mar-
kets, and economic diversification
Rural Economy and Agriculture: fish management, protection, and regula-
tion; management of natural resources and environment; water resource
exploitation; protection of rivers and lakes from pollution
Economic Affairs: resource mobilization; vision and assessment for eco-
nomic development; promotion of the private sector; coordination of devel-
opment of African economies; monetary and fiscal policies.
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centers would encourage better use of equipment at the national level, encour-
age sharing of information at the regional level, and make a significant contri-
bution to maritime regulation, maritime safety, and law enforcement.
With the Maritime Coordination Unit working on these measures, the special
representative should focus next on maritime law enforcement. Both the Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct and MOWCA’s Gulf of Guinea Coast Guard network
agreement call for combined maritime patrols to enforce international and Afri-
can maritime laws. A host of global partners are involved in such operations, but
the efforts are not well coordinated and African participation is spotty. The spe-
cial commissioner should coordinate and formalize these partnerships to help
provide an immediate law-enforcement capability, build African human capac-
ity, and realize immediate financial gains from the enforcement of laws. Again
the regional economic communities could play roles here, especially in
brokering patrol agreements in sovereign waters.
Once the African Union establishes clear, strong leadership, it will be well po-
sitioned to lead the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector. The
special representative can then begin the hard task of developing the technical
mechanisms of the International Charter. The good news is that the other im-
mediate actions, taken by now, will have built confidence in global partners.
Certain of these actions—law assessment, strategy development, informa-
tion fusion and sharing, and combined operations—are relatively easy, inexpen-
sive measures that would immediately demonstrate the African Union’s
sincerity and resolve to improve the African maritime sector. They would en-
courage global partners to join the International Charter and go a long way to-
ward addressing maritime issues in and of themselves. Furthermore, the AU
does not need to wait for the development of an overarching maritime strategy
to begin taking some of these steps; there is already a charter to review the mari-
time laws, and the regional economic communities provide frameworks for fus-
ing and sharing maritime information. Admittedly, and as noted below,
coordinating global combined task forces may involve political or legal chal-
lenges, but it is important and should not be pushed aside for that reason. Add-
ing African mariners to combined task forces should be easy (it is already being
done, as mentioned above) and will pay big dividends in building human
capacity.
WHAT GLOBAL PARTNERS CAN DO NOW
Global partners can continue and expand their efforts to provide platforms for
African maritime law enforcement through current protocols, efforts, and rela-
tionships. They can also assist AU efforts to fuse and share information. Both are
in the mutual interest of the international community and African partners.
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Any of the existing counterpiracy task forces could include African boarding
teams, thereby enabling African participation and ownership while improving
African capacity. The most difficult impediments are likely legal factors sur-
rounding the handling of captured pirates; after nearly two years of operations,
however, these should not be insurmountable challenges. Of equal importance,
global partners should work with the International Maritime Organization and
the AU to consolidate these various task forces into one, coordinated organiza-
tion in order to improve efficiency and simplify command and control. Under
the leadership of the AU, the UN, and African states, such a force should expand
its mandate to embrace the enforcement of international and African maritime
laws, including those concerning illegal fishing and illegal dumping.
The Southern African Development Community and the United States could
continue and expand their support in maritime law enforcement in, respec-
tively, South and East Africa and West and Central Africa. Other partners—
whether from Europe, Asia, the Americas, or Africa itself—could join these ef-
forts by sending vessels and boarding teams to operate with Africans, expanding
the breadth and duration of the patrols. Global partners could also formalize
standing combined task forces; one might envision three to four combined task
forces, aligned with the African Union’s African Standby Forces (organized and
managed by the regional economic communities), operating nonstop to help
enforce international and African maritime law. These task forces could even be
considered United Nations missions and the personnel employed allowed spe-
cial UN mission pay and allowances, to encourage participation.
Global partners could provide technical and financial assistance to help the
AU and subregional organizations fuse and share information. That would not
only help African maritime domain awareness but provide valuable intelligence
to maritime law-enforcement operations and improve safety for mariners. Tak-
ing these two steps would also enable the IMO, the AU, and the latter’s members
to begin work on the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector, as
well as to concentrate on building and improving maritime governance, trade,
commerce, and economies in Africa—leaving the more costly tasks of building
coast guards and navies for the middle term.
Finally, there is no reason that stakeholders should delay training programs.
Global partners should act quickly to dedicate money specifically to training
maritime professionals in the military, police, and civilian sectors—especially in
the areas of governance. Investing in human capacity could be as easy as incor-
porating more African ship riders on the existing international task forces or
brokering exchanges of personnel between port authorities, and it is surely one
of the most important aspects of building maritime institutions.
{LINE-SPACE}
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Safe and secure African seas, governed by fair and transparent regulations, are
on the global agenda. African military and maritime leaders recognize the im-
portance of the matter and have taken some steps to address a few issues. The
policy documents, statements, and plans of action they have produced are im-
portant tools for organizing action—and combined patrols are important in
and of themselves—but Africa lacks an overarching vision that could tie the var-
ious efforts together and strike at core problems (development and governance)
rather than merely the symptoms (such as piracy). The world needs a strategy
for an African maritime economy—a regime led by Africans with committed
global partnership, a maritime economy benefiting African national economies
and the global market. The African Union has taken some steps in this direction,
especially through its Maritime Transport Charter. It is time, however, to move
beyond policy papers and on to strategy-based action. Establishing a continental
maritime economy—with improved governance, trade, infrastructure, safety,
and security—is not an easy task, especially since it involves the laws of fifty-four
countries and implies adherence to those laws by the rest of the world.
Establishment of an International Charter for the African Maritime Sector
would be a way to meet these ends. Its goals would be to help African member
states establish a regional maritime economy with capacity and capability in all
maritime sectors; to provide security and law-enforcement support in the short
and middle terms; to create a trust to fund improvements; and to erect checks
and balances to promote good governance and noncorrupt, efficient, modern
maritime structures. While Africa and the rest of the international community
works to establish this charter, the African Union and its global partners should
inculcate maritime leadership at the AU, review maritime laws, improve infor-
mation fusion and sharing, and continue to enforce African maritime laws
through combined operations. With these bold steps the African Union, its sub-
regional organizations, its member states, and its global partners can make great
progress toward an African maritime sector that generates the security, confi-
dence, and efficiency necessary to spark the investment, trade, and jobs vital for
the continent’s prosperity.
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